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Abstract: This paper examines the various issues and challenges confronting fiscal 
federalism in Nigeria‟s Fourth Republic. It argues that there is the need to find a revenue 
base in order to maintain the important function of governments at all levels but managing 
these important government function and the accompanying revenue base has been a major 
challenge for intergovernmental relations in the current democratic experience. Several 
issues bothering on the operation of the federal structure, revenue allocation and resource 
control have dominated the country‟s fiscal federalism practice in the fourth republic with 
their attendant crises and contortions. The paper submits that restructuring the federal polity 
in a „true sense‟ of it and constitutional adherence to provisions on common good are 
recipes that would ensure and guarantee a smooth, unhindered fiscal relations among the 
federal, state and local governments in Nigeria. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The issue of intergovernmental 
relation has received apt attention 
from scholars over time in Nigeria 
and the world over. This attention 
becomes imperative as there are 
increasing levels of interaction 
among the different tiers of 
government in every country. The 
concept of intergovernmental 
relations describes “the gamut of 
activities or interactions that take 
place between and among the 
different levels of government 
within a state” (Roberts 1999:60). 
It is essentially a practice that 
defines the patterns of interactions 
among the layers of government in 
a state. Even though, it is often 
used to describe interactions 
among governmental unit in a 
federal state, it is a practice that is 
common to other non-federal 
states. This is because other forms 
of government do manage their 
affairs as well. In these forms of 
government such as the unitary 
system, government is structured 
into many divisions like counties, 
regions or local governments but 
these layers of government are not 
constitutionally empowered like 
the central government that 
created them. However, the reality 
is that interactions occur among 
them for the purpose of 
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administrative convenience in 
realizing governmental objectives. 
As a machinery of operating 
federal structures, 
intergovernmental relation dates 
back to the Greek civilization 
when concerted efforts were made 
to describe the legal relationships 
between the leagues and the city 
states (Akinyemi et.al 1979). 
These legal relationships are 
codified as principles that find 
expressions in a constitution for 
the purpose of managing 
intergovernmental relation (Mc 
Whinney: 1983). A basic defining 
feature of federalism in the 
distribution of powers between the 
centre and the constituent units by 
constitutional means (Osaghe, 
1990: cf Aiyede: 2005, 221), 
however, the only area that has 
received unending attention in the 
distribution of such powers and 
responsibilities is the fiscal 
arrangement. Fundamentally, 
fiscal finance has dominated 
public discourse in Nigeria‟s 
federal arrangement more than any 
other issue even before 
independence. This is simply 
because the process of distribution 
of power and responsibilities has 
financial implications hence the 
struggle by the federating units to 
influence the fiscal arrangements. 
Finance has therefore emerged as 
the most critical policy issue in 
Nigeria‟s colonial and post-
colonial political economy with its 
attendant crises. This paper 
therefore seeks to examine the 
challenges of managing 
intergovernmental relations and 
the issues that have dominated 
fiscal federalism in Nigeria‟s 
fourth republic with the view to 
exploring the options for harmony. 
 
Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations in Nigeria: A 
Histography 
The evolution of fiscal federalism 
in Nigeria can be properly situated 
within the different political and 
constitutional, social, cultural and 
economic developments which 
have in turn influenced the nature 
and character as well as the pattern 
of intergovernmental relations in 
Nigeria before and after 
independence. It is more expedient 
to properly work out fiscal 
arrangements among the different 
levels of government. This is for 
the purpose of ensuring fiscal 
balance in the content of macro-
economic stability. Fiscal 
federalism therefore suggests a 
legal arrangement describing the 
distribution of revenue among the 
different levels of government in a 
federal structure. For government 
to fulfill its constitutional 
responsibilities of maintaining law 
and order and providing social 
amenities that promote citizens‟ 
well-being, governments at all 
levels must imperatively find a 
revenue base. It is the management 
and distribution of such revenues 
that forms the crux of fiscal 
federalism. 
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Extant literature agrees that it has 
been problematic to work out a 
generally acceptable formula for 
sharing revenues between and 
among the different levels of 
government in pre-independent 
Nigeria. The problem continues to 
characterize fiscal relations in 
Nigeria up till today. Based on 
this, the approach adopted to solve 
the age-long problem is the 
distribution of national revenues 
on the basis of recommendations 
made by a revenue allocation 
commission or committee set up 
by the federal government from 
time to time. It is worthy of note 
that the adoption of federalism in 
Nigeria since 1954, apart from 
Aguiyi Ironsi‟s unitary system in 
1966 has ensured the continuous 
decentralization of governmental 
structures, powers and 
responsibilities hence the periodic 
changes in fiscal arrangements. 
Any incisive analysis of fiscal 
relations in Nigeria will require 
periodization as follows: 
 
(i) Pre-Independence era 
(1946-1958) 
(ii) Post-Independence era 
(1964-1999) 
(iii) Fourth Republic 
experiences (1999-date) 
The Pre-independence Era 
/Period of Teleguided Fiscal 
Federalism 
Incredibly, the colonial Nigerian 
state also witnessed the crisis of 
fiscal relations between the 
existing governmental structures. 
Before the 1960 and 1963 
independence and Republican 
Constitutions were introduced, 
fiscal arrangements were largely 
influenced by political and 
constitutional factors. This 
occasioned the creation of several 
commissions to renew and review 
existing fiscal arrangements and 
make appropriate 
recommendations. These 
commissions and highlights of 
their recommendations are 
discussed below: 
 
The Phillipson Commission 
The creation of regional 
assemblies in the Western and 
Eastern regions as well as the 
establishment of a Northern 
regional council under the 1946 
Richards constitution necessitated 
the allocation of a degree of 
financial responsibilities to these 
new bodies. Consequent upon this, 
the financial secretary to the 
Nigerian Government Sydney 
Phillipson was appointed sole 
commissioner charged with the 
duties of preparing financial 
arrangement under the new 
constitution. The Phillipson 
Commission, as it was later 
known, was mandated to study 
indepthly and make useful 
recommendations regarding the 
problems of the administrative and 
financial procedure to be adopted 
under the new constitution. The 
commission was pre-occupied 
with attempts to resolve three 
fundamental problems namely: 
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(i) The criteria to be used in 
declaring revenue as 
regional revenue 
(ii) How to determine the size 
of the grants from the 
central revenue and 
(iii) The formula for allocating 
grants among the regions 
 
The problems are fundamental 
problems of the sub-national 
governments which would define 
the extent of their freedom and 
relevance in the federation 
(Adamolekun, 2005: 63). This 
problem also relate to the pattern 
of fiscal federalism in Australia. 
However, the onerous challenge 
faced by the Phillipson 
Commission was how to derive a 
formula for distributing grants 
among the regions. Two 
principles were considered by the 
commission in the light of the 
above task: 
 
(a) Derivation and 
(b) Even Progress or Even 
Development. 
 
The commission suggested that 
the sharing of the grants be based 
solely on the principle of 
derivation. The shares, as 
distributed among the three 
regions into which the federation 
was divided were as follows: East 
24%, West 30% and North 46%. 
Instructively, the implementation 
of the Phillipson Commission 
recommendations marked a 
watershed in the adoption of the 
principle of derivation in sharing 
revenue among the regions in 
Nigeria. The derivation principle, 
as rightly observed by Ekpo 
(2004) has since become a thorny 
issue in Nigeria‟s inter-
governmental fiscal relations. 
 
The Hicks-Phillipson 
Commission 
The revenue allocation system 
under the Phillipson commission 
generated greater dissatisfaction 
among the federating units. The 
decision to also transfer 
educational grants-in-aid from the 
central to the regional estimates 
further exacerbated the 
dissatisfaction. Consequently, the 
Hicks-Phillipson Commission 
was appointed in June 1950 to 
among other terms of reference 
submit proposals to the governor-
in –council for division of 
revenue over a period of five 
years between the three regions 
and the central Nigerian services 
in order to achieve in that time a 
progressively more equitable 
division of revenue among the 
three separate regions and the 
centre (Adefulu, 2001). In 
allocating revenue therefore, the 
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commission adopted the 
following criteria: liberty, Justice, 
fraternity and efficiency. It 
consequently recommended four 
principles corresponding to these 
criteria namely: 
 
i. Independent revenue 
ii. Derivation 
iii. Need and 
iv. National Interest. 
 
The Commission further 
apportioned 50% of tobacco tax 
on derivation principle; based 
capital grants on the principle of 
need and transferred to the federal 
budget, police and education. The 
native Authority Police received 
50% national interest. 
Surprisingly, the commission 
recommended that a one-time 
grant of 4 million be paid to the 
Northern region as compensation 
for its deprivation, arguing that 
the North was under-capitalized 
as compared to other regions. 
This singular move further 
deteriorated the process of 
national cohesion and fomented 
inter-regional conflicts and 
misunderstanding. 
 
The Louis-Chick Commission 
As the nationalist struggle 
persisted, the two constitutional 
conferences of 1953 and 1954 in 
London and Lagos respectively 
created the Louis-Chick 
Commission. Aside other terms 
of reference, the commission was 
tasked with the mandate of 
providing the center and the 
regions an adequate measure of 
fiscal autonomy and the 
importance of applying the 
principle of derivation to the 
fullest degree compatible with 
meeting the reasonable needs of 
the two governmental units. 
Fiscal autonomy in therefore not 
an oil driven agitation as many 
would want to believe, but major 
feature of the crisis of pre-
independence Nigeria‟s fiscal 
federalism. As reported by 
Adefulu (2001), the report of the 
commission provided that: 
 
(1) The federal government 
should retain the revenue 
from the following: 
company income tax, and 
50% of the duties on 
exports, tobacco, excise 
and import. 
(2) 50% of import duties 
except those on tobacco 
and motor spirits should 
be shared thus: 
West 40% 
North 30% 
East 29% 
Southern Cameroon 1% 
(3) Revenue from the 
following sources should 
be shared among the 
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regions in accordance 
with regional 
consumption: 50% of 
tobacco, export and excise 
duties; 100% of the duty 
on motor spirit, all mining 
rents and royalties and 
fees from small craft 
licenses. 
 
The Raisman-Tress 
Commission 
The commission was inaugurated 
as a result of the shortcomings of 
the Louis Chick Commission. 
The disaffection with the chick‟s 
commission was based on three 
grounds: 
 
(1) Insufficient independent 
revenue to the regions 
(2) The utilization of the 
principle of derivation in 
revenue allocation and  
(3) The rejection of the 
principle of need and 
national interest in 
revenue allocation. 
 
In its recommendations, the 
commission divided each type of 
revenue into three parts to be paid 
to states of origin, federal 
government and the newly 
introduced distributable pool 
account. These included for the 
states of origin 50% of mining 
rents, royalties and import duties; 
for the distributable pool account 
30% of mining rents and royalties 
as well as 40% of import duties. 
The sharing of the distributable 
pool account was as follows: 
   North 40% 
   West 31% 
   East 24% 
   Southern Cameroon 5%. 
 
Significantly, fiscal federalism in 
pre-independent Nigeria was 
characterized by agitations for 
autonomy, frequent alterations in 
revenue allocation formula as a 
result of rapid political and 
constitutional developments, and 
inter-ethnic misunderstanding. It 
was summarily an era of 
teleguided fiscal arrangements. 
 
The Post Independence 
Era/Period of Self-Determinism 
During this period, 
intergovernmental fiscal relation 
was conditioned by significant 
economic, social and political 
changes including an almost 
three-year fratricidal war (July 
1967-January 1970). This war, 
and its attendant consequences 
coupled with the frequency of 
military rule and the bourgeoning 
oil economy largely affected 
government expenditure and 
revenue patterns. Also political 
structure was significantly altered 
as the form of government was 
decentralized in 1967 with the 
creation of 12 states out of the 
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erst-while four regions. Similar 
exercise followed in 1976, 1987, 
1991 and 1996 bringing the total 
number of states to 36 with Abuja 
as the Federal Capital Territory, 
which received full governmental 
status and thus was entitled to 
federal allocation. 
 
Another significant development 
during this period was the official 
recognition accorded local 
government as the third tier of 
government thereby making it 
entitled to federal funds. The 
frequency of military rule and its 
modus operandi affected 
Nigeria‟s fiscal operations. 
Instructively, the issues 
highlighted above and many 
others extensively influenced 
positively or negatively the 
evolution of fiscal federalism 
during Nigeria‟s post 
independence period. The 
commission/committee approach 
to the share of federally collected 
revenue still dominated post-
independence fiscal relations. 
Consequently, the Binns revenue 
commission was appointed in 
1964 to review the country‟s 
financial arrangement following 
the introduction of a republican 
constitution in 1963. The 
commission after several 
deliberations recommended that 
the distributable pool 
account(DPA) would be shared in 
the ratio of 42% to North, 30% to 
East, 20% to West and 8% to the 
Mid-west region. Following the 
creation of 12 states, the 
empanelled Dina‟s committee 
recommended that for onshore 
operations, 15% was set aside for 
federal government, 10% to state 
of derivation (40% less than what 
obtained in the first republic) and 
75% to DPA (Oketa, 2001:174). 
In respect of the offshore 
operations, 6%, 30% and 10% 
was earmarked for the federal 
government, DPA and Special 
Account respectively (Ibid). The 
table below explicitly explains the 
committee‟s recommendations. 
Account ED1 IM2 ED3 MRI4 MRRO5 
Federal 60 50 15 15 60 
State derivation - - 10 10 - 
State Joint 30 50 70 70 30 
Special Grants 10 - 5 5 10 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Report of the interim revenue allocation committee (cf Ekpo: 1995) 
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Notes: 1 Excise Duty; 2 Import 
duty; 3 Export duty, 4 Mining 
Royalty (on shore); 5 Mining rent 
and Royalty (off shore). 
 
Fundamental Changes in revenue 
allocation were effected in 1970 
via Decree No. 13. The changes 
included a reduction in export 
duties meant for states of origin to 
60% from 100% while 40% was 
allocated to the federal 
government, a redistribution of 
duty on fuel paid to states of 
consumption on the basis of 50%-
50% between the federal 
government and the affected 
states, reduction of 5% mining 
rents and royalties paid to state of 
origin to 45%, Excise to be shared 
between the federal government 
and the distributable pool account, 
the DPA to be distributed 50% on 
a proportionate basis to the 
population of each state. Certain 
fundamental changes were also 
noticeable in 1971 (Courtesy 
Decree No. 9) and 1975. 
 
The Tunji Aboyade Technical 
Committee of 1977 which was 
saddled inter alia with the task of 
taking into consideration the need 
to ensure that  each government of 
the federation had adequate 
revenue to enable it discharge its 
responsibilities with regard to 
population, equality of status 
among states, derivation, 
geographical peculiarities, even 
development, national interest and 
any other factor bearing on the 
problem (Ekpo 2004), 
recommended 57% to the federal 
government, 30% to state joint, 
10% to local governments and 3% 
to Special grants. The nullification 
of the recommendations of the 
Okigbo commission by the 
Supreme Court on October2, 1981 
paved way for a new revenue act 
passed by the parliament. Under 
the new act, federally collected 
revenues were distributed as 
follows: federal government 55%, 
State 35% and local governments 
10%. The statutory share of the 
state was distributed thus: 
 
1. 30.5% to be shared among 
the states on the basis of: 
(a) Minimum responsibility of 
government 4% 
(b) Population 4% 
(c) Social development as 
indicated-15% (by primary 
school enrolment of which 
11.5% is based on direct 
primary school enrolment 
and 3.5% on inverse 
enrolment) 
(d) Internal revenue effort 
measured as the ratio of 
total internal revenue to 
total recurrent expenditure 
5% 
2. 3.5% for the mineral 
producing states shared on 
the basis of derivation 
3. 1% to be allocated to the 
federal fund for ecological 
problems. 
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It is useful to mention that the 
1981 revenue Act remained in use 
until December 1987. Perhaps, it 
remained the most ensuring effort 
at fiscal arrangement since 1946. 
Instructively, the National 
Revenue Mobilization, Allocation 
and Fiscal Commission were 
inaugurated in 1988 under the 
chairmanship of General T.Y 
Danjuma (Rtd). The commission 
reviewed existing fiscal 
arrangements and in 1989 
submitted its report to the federal 
government. Government accepted 
the recommendations of the 
Danjuma Commission and 
modified certain aspects of the 
revenue allocation formula as 
shown below: 
 
 
Commission Recommendation   Government’s Approval 
Vertical Allocation 
Federal Government  47%   50% 
State Government  30%   30% 
Local Government  15%   15% 
Special Funds   8%   5% 
               100%   100% 
Special Funds 
Federal Territory   1.0%FA  1.0% 
Stabilization   0.5%FA  0.5% 
Savings    2.0%FA  - 
Derivation   2.0%MR  1.0% 
Development of oil MPA 1.5%OMR  1.5% 
Development of Non-oil MPA 0.5%NOMR  - 
General Ecology   0.5%   1.0%  
                 8.0%   8.0% 
Horizontal Allocation 
Equality of States  40%   40% 
Population   30%   30% 
Social Dev. Factor  10%   10% 
Land Mass and Terrain    -   10% 
Internal Revenue Effort  20%   10%   
                                                   100%   100% 
Source: Olutayo (1998) 
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One reducible observation from 
the foregoing historical analysis is 
that the recommendations of each 
fiscal commission/committee set 
up by the federal government do 
not go without any form of 
controversy or criticism. These 
controversies were responsible for 
the dispanelling of the various 
revenue allocation committees by 
successive administrations in 
Nigeria and this has partly been 
responsible for a number of 
contortions and contradictions the 
revenue allocation formula went 
through under various 
governments. The pattern of fiscal 
relation in Nigeria has equally 
been largely affected by the 
prevailing political 
structure/system whether colonial, 
civilian or military and extensively 
by the style of leadership 
orientation either democratic or 
autocratic. The observable crisis of 
revenue allocation associated with 
successive governments in Nigeria 
did not abate in the present fourth 
republic as many formula have 
been experimented without any 
logical effect on intergovernmental 
fiscal relations. For instance, the  
 
revenue allocation and fiscal 
commission had proposed to the 
National Assembly in 1999 that 
the federal revenue be shared in 
the following order: Federal 
government 47.19%, State 
governments 31.10%, Local 
governments 15.21% and National 
priorities services fund 6.5%. 
Additionally, the new horizontal 
formula were to determine in 
actual terms how the 31.10% to 
the States, the 15.21% to the local 
governments and 13% derivation 
(to states, local government and 
community entities) are to be 
shared. Despite ferocious 
agitations for 50% derivation, the 
commission still maintained the 
13% recommended by the 
constitutional conference of 1995. 
The proposal also indicated that 
79.15% of the horizontal 
distribution was based on three 
indices namely equality, 
population and internal revenue 
generation effort. 
However, the civilian 
administration of President 
Olusegun Obasanjo dramatically 
made volatile changes to the 
proposed revenue allocation 
formula at will throughout his 
eight year tenure making 
intergovernmental fiscal relation 
assume a new dimension in the 
fourth republic and purposely 
redefined the nature and size of 
governmental structures. Aside 
this, the absence of reliable census 
figures particularly when 
population is used as a revenue 
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sharing index and the unreliability 
of socio-economic data used by 
various commissions have 
contributed to the down-ward 
trend fiscal federalism has 
experienced in the past. Having 
explored the histography of fiscal 
federalism in Nigeria, it is 
compelling to delve into the issues 
and challenges that characterize 
federal-state-local fiscal relations 
in the present fourth republic. 
 
Managing Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Relations in Nigeria’s 
Fourth Republic: Issues and 
Challenges 
A balance sheet of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations 
under successive governments in 
Nigeria summarizes the fact that 
the whole processes and 
arrangements have been and are 
still marred with problems and 
conflicts which are structural and 
operational in nature. Of course, 
the problems are generic as they 
are traceable to the formative years 
of the country when it was still 
under full blown colonialism. 
Unfortunately, the political elites 
who inherited the post colonial 
Nigerian political structures have 
surprisingly found it difficult to 
surmount these challenges and 
have failed to evolve a truly 
adaptable pragmatic fiscal 
arrangement devoid of mundane 
primordial sentiments that have 
bedeviled the practice of 
federalism in Nigeria. While the 
belief was and is still shared today 
that in order to maintain law and 
order, ensure good governance and 
provide social amenities, a revenue 
base must be found, the dynamics 
of mobilizing and allocating the 
revenue have always been 
problematic in Nigeria‟s federal 
practice. This is because the 
jurisdictional powers of raising 
revenue and the criteria for 
allocating federally collected 
revenue have been severally 
contested by all governmental 
structures. Previous attempts at 
finding a suitable revenue 
allocation formula acceptable to 
all governmental units have been 
faulted even right from the 
colonial era. This view is aptly 
captured by Oketa (2001:172) 
when he asserts that: 
 
The native authority 
revenue ordinance of 1917 
was established to realize 
the need to maintain law 
and order, good 
government as well as 
provide Social services. 
Unfortunately the 1917 
arrangement by the 
colonial Government was 
hardly satisfactory. This 
necessitated the setting up 
of the very first fiscal 
commission in 1946 under 
the chairmanship of Sir 
Sidney Phillipson. 
 
Since then, over nine of such 
commissions have been 
empanelled and dispanelled 
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bringing in the process various 
contortions and conflicts that have 
brought a spill-over effect to the 
present fourth republic. Therefore 
events of the fourth republic 
cannot be divorced from their 
historical past. The major issues 
and challenges raised in fiscal 
finance discourse in the current 
political experiment can be located 
within four issues namely the 
structure of Nigeria‟s federalism; 
the question of what constitutes 
the Nigerian federation and the 
attendant agitation for local 
government autonomy; derivation 
principle/resource control and 
revenue allocation formula. 
 
At the structural level, the practice 
of federalism in Nigeria is far from 
the realities of federal systems like 
Canada, the United States of 
America, India and Australia. 
Architects of the current 
operational federal constitution in 
Nigeria have erroneously 
neglected the need to reflect the 
principles of theory and practice of 
federalism the world over which 
has arguably made the 1999 
Nigerian constitution defective. It 
was on this defective note that 
present republic was inaugurated. 
To be certain a federal principle 
both in theory and practice is, 
according to K.C. Wheare 
(1963:10) “the method of diving 
powers so that the general and 
regional governments are each, 
within a sphere, coordinate and 
independent”. 
 
However, the method of dividing 
powers between the federal 
government and the sub-national 
governments has made the federal 
government too large and 
powerful while the sub-national 
governments are too small and 
weak thereby subservient to 
federal might. Although federal 
theorists did not agree in extant 
literature on the nature and size of 
each government in a federation, 
i.e. whether the federal 
government should be more 
powerful than the sub-national 
governments, or vice-versa, the 
comments of where are instructive 
as each government is allocated 
independent and co-ordinate 
powers. The structure of federal 
practice in Nigeria has deliberately 
placed the federal government at 
the center of intergovernmental 
relations which has implication for 
fiscal finance. The lopsided federal 
structure which skewed favorably 
towards the centre has 
consequential effect on the 
jurisdictional allocation of power 
and responsibilities. This reflected 
in the relations between the 
contents of the exclusive and 
current legislative lists of the 1999 
constitution. The federal 
constitution empowered the 
federal government to allocate to 
itself juicy and lucrative 
responsibilities such as federation 
account, control of arms, 
ammunition and explosives, 
aviation, census, defense, foreign 
policy, currency etc with huge 
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financial attractions. Instructively, 
only the federal government can 
legislate on the matters contained 
in the exclusive list. The 
concurrent list which 
accommodates joint legislative 
powers by both federal and state 
governments on such matters as 
university, primary education, 
revenue allocation, tax collection, 
electric power, agricultural 
development etc is 
overwhelmingly dominated by the 
federal government in practice. 
The state governments are 
subordinate even in their primary 
areas of jurisdiction made possible 
by the provisions of the 1999 
constitution. Indeed the preamble 
to the concurrent list of the 1999 
constitution prescribes that: 
subject to this constitution, the 
National Assembly may by an Act 
make provisions for all matters in 
that list including those on revenue 
allocation, statistics, agriculture, 
health and education (FGN, 1999). 
This provision has made the states 
subservient to the „almighty‟ 
federal government even on their 
constitutional responsibilities and 
powers. Clearly, this hegemonic 
tendency of the federal 
government negates where‟s 
conception of federalism. 
Akinsanya (1989) rightly observed 
this in first republic 
intergovernmental relation when 
he noted that: 
 
intergovernmental 
relations in Nigeria has 
not only been 
characterized by the 
political and financial 
dependency of the state on 
the federal government but 
also by an ubiquity of the 
federal government in 
matters which the 
constitution of the federal 
republic of Nigeria 1963 
reserved to the states, for 
example primary 
education and even in 
matters in which the 
federal government despite 
its concurrent jurisdiction 
had been inactive. 
 
The domino theory of 
intergovernmental relations as 
reminded us by Adedokun (1997) 
has extremely granted the power 
of the purse to the federal 
government with respect to the 
collections and distributions of the 
most lucrative revenues. The 
overbearing tendencies of the 
federal structure has continued to 
generate demands from state 
governments and other relevant 
stakeholders in Nigeria‟s federal 
project for restructuring the 
country‟s federal system to clearly 
give space for sub-national 
governments to demonstrate their 
true powers in an ideal federation 
since, according to (Adamolekun, 
2005:63), the role of sub-national 
governments in raising revenues 
and their actual spending powers 
are regarded as good indicators of 
the degree of decentralization in a 
given state. 
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Another issue that has generated 
unprecedented hitch in the fourth 
republic‟s fiscal finance discourse 
relates to the agitation for local 
government autonomy with 
concomitant financial 
independence. No previous era in 
Nigeria‟s history of political and 
constitutional development has 
witnessed tensed face-off between 
the federal government and the 
state governments over who 
controls local governments than 
the present political dispensation. 
The tensed nature of the face off 
generated many legal tussles at the 
Supreme Court especially between 
2001 and 2007 and again 
resurfaces at the present 
constitutional amendment 
exercises. Proponents of local 
government autonomy see local 
government as a full-fledged tier 
of government as provided by the 
1979 constitution consequent upon 
the 1976 local government reform. 
Another re-organization carried 
out at the local government level 
by the Ibrahim Badamosi 
Babangida military regime in 1987 
further increased the posture of 
local government in Nigeria‟s 
tripartite governmental 
arrangements with improved 
responsibilities and financial 
allocation. However, experiences 
from the fourth republic are totally 
different. State governments have 
consistently argued that local 
governments are appendages of 
the state and therefore should be 
treated as such. The question often 
raised by the state governments 
begging for answer is what 
constitutes federating units in 
Nigeria?. The answer to this 
question would simply lay to rest 
the agitation for local government 
autonomy. From all intent and 
purposes, the provisions of the 
1999 constitution are clear on what 
constitutes the federating units. 
Section 2 (2) of chapter 1 of the 
General provision of 1999 
constitution provides that: 
 
“Nigeriashall be a 
federation consisting of 
states and a Federal 
Capital Territory” (FGN, 
1999: LL15) 
 
The provision above implicitly 
surrendered the power of control 
and supervision of local 
governments to state governments. 
In fact, a cursory look at the 
provision disempowers local 
governments from accessing funds 
from the federation account since 
it is not a federating unit 
constitutionally. But the practice 
of federalism in Nigeria, an 
aberration of classical theory and 
practice of fiscal federalism has 
continued to sustain local 
governments‟ access to federally 
collected revenue. The present 
political dispensation has 
witnessed stiffened relationship 
between the federal government 
and state governments over local 
government system. The desire of 
states to create additional local 
governments for effective local 
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governance and service delivery 
has been constantly hampered by 
the federal might as witnessed 
between the federal government 
and the Lagos State Government 
in 2003. The lopsided federal 
arrangement that skewed power 
towards the center unwittingly 
allowed the federal government to 
deny Lagos State Government of 
federal allocations to its local 
governments unless it was ready to 
revert its decision on creation of 
additional local governments. It 
was simply a daring political 
robbery and gang rape of the 1999 
constitution by the hegemonic 
federal government. Clearly, 
section 7 (1) of part 2 of the 1999 
constitution expressly provides 
that:  
 
“the system of local 
government by 
democratically elected 
local government councils 
is under this constitution 
guaranteed; and 
accordingly the 
Government of every state 
shall subject to section 8 of 
this constitution, ensure 
their existence under a law 
which provides for the 
establishment, structure, 
composition, finance and 
functions of such 
councils”. 
 
The above provision has 
instructively fore-closed the 
autonomy of local government in 
terms of financial independence 
but architects of local government 
autonomy movement have only 
exacerbated the loopholes 
exploited by the centrifugal forces 
in fourth republic‟s transitional 
politics. This is because the 
horizontal and vertical relations on 
resource mobilizations and 
allocation have been severely 
constrained. 
 
At another level, the resource 
control/deviation imbroglio has 
thrown the country‟s fiscal 
federalism into political and 
economic crises fueling in the 
process inter and intra-ethnic 
conflicts and occasioned the 
sudden uprising of different 
insurgent groups within the 
Niger/Delta region of the country. 
The most contentious issue at the 
genesis of the present political era 
in 1999 was the demand for 
resource control particularly by oil 
producing states that constitute the 
Niger-Delta region. The demand 
for resource control became 
unattainable as the federal 
government resisted the agitation 
by “all means”. However, the 
agitations have taken several 
violent dimensions bordering 
according to Adefulu (2001:80) 
“on willful sabotage, kidnapping 
of foreigners working in the oil 
exploration sector, assassination of 
security agents and vandalisation 
of oil pipelines all of which have 
meant a substantial loss of revenue 
to the Nigerian state which 
depends on oil export earnings to 
finance its varied development 
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projects and alleviate circle of 
poverty afflicting its teeming 
population”. The agitations for 
resource control were founded on 
the obvious long years of neglect 
of the region despite the nation 
tapping almost 95% of its revenue 
earnings from the region. Socio-
economic activities of the people 
of the zone have suffered abruptly 
while environmental degradation 
and health hazards have attended 
oil exploration activities of 
multinational companies without 
adequate infrastructure, qualitative 
education and human capital 
development, accessible health 
care system and environmental 
renewal as compensations for the 
immeasurable losses suffered over 
years. It was within this context 
that the Yar‟ Adua Administration 
granted the Niger-Delta militants 
who took to violent protest 
Amnesty as a panacea for restoring 
peace within the region and 
apparently for the federal 
government to continue to reap 
from the largesse of oil revenue 
from the region. However, how 
much of peace the Amnesty 
Programme has brought to the 
Niger-Delta is another topical 
issue for a stimulating debate but 
that is outside the purview of this 
paper. The derivation principle 
which grew out of the agitation for 
resource control does not go 
without controversies. For 
instance, the contestation for the 
distinction between offshore and 
on-shore oil in the implementation 
of the 13% derivation allocation to 
oil producing state generated a lot 
of heat until the omnibus judgment 
of the supreme court on 5 April 
2002 which declared that the 
littoral states could not seek 
control of natural resources 
located beyond their sea ward 
boundary legally. The on-
shore/offshore dichotomy has 
implication for revenue accruable 
from derivation on oil hence the 
fierce and partisan politics it 
generated in the beginning of the 
fourth republic. It is in this sense 
that the oil producing States are 
demanding for the restructuring of 
the Nigerian federation to allow 
for the practice of true federalism 
which guarantees states control of 
resources located within their 
boundaries. The structural 
imbalance in wealth distribution 
coupled with the damage to the 
ecosystem in the areas make the 
demand more compelling. An 
Editorial in the Guardian sums up 
the situation in the Niger Delta 
thus:  
 
The states of the region 
provide the nation with 
about 95 percent of its 
income to the extent that 
Nigeria runs a mono-
cultural economy that is 
dependent on crude oil 
resources extracted from 
Niger-Delta region. In 
return for its being the 
wealth basin of the 
country, however, the 
Niger Delta suffers much 
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neglect. Its peoples are 
impoverished in the midst 
of so much wealth; their 
lives are constantly 
endangered on account of 
oil exploration activities 
resulting in perpetual 
damages to the eco-system 
and the environment (July 
24,2000:20 cf Adefulu 
2001) 
 
It is therefore not out of place to 
demand restructuring of the fiscal 
arrangements in favour of the 
region that lays the „Golden egg‟ 
considering the unsalutory effect 
oil exploration activities have had 
on the economic life of the people 
in the Niger Delta region and the 
danger of oil pollution and 
spillage, environmental 
degradation etc to which they are 
exposed (Bello-Imam, 1990:29). 
Lastly, and relating to the resource 
control/derivation palaver is the 
issue of resource allocation which 
has generated a lot of heat in the 
polity from the commencement of 
the present operational political 
dispensation in 1999 till the 
present moment. Resource 
allocation which ordinarily is an 
economic issue has turned into a 
political agenda because of the 
„high political content‟ contained 
in its discourse. Arriving at an 
acceptable formula for sharing 
federally collected revenue has 
been problematic and thorny 
between the three tiers of 
government. This is because each 
governmental structure raises 
argument of mismatch between 
responsibilities and revenue. The 
experimented formula and the 
sharing principles have witnessed 
high content of intrigues, power 
play, sectional interest and partisan 
politics. For instance, sharing 
revenue on the basis of land-mass 
does not only depict sectional 
interest but also erroneously shifts 
development away from the 
people, thereby making 
development land-focused instead 
of being people oriented. The 
adopted formula in use presently is 
allocated in the ratio of 52% to the 
federal government, 26.7% to 
states and 20.60% to local 
governments. This again depicts 
the ubiquity and dominance of the 
federal government in the 
allocation of responsibilities and 
revenue, subjecting in the process 
other sub-national governments to 
the whim and caprices of the over 
bloated federal government. The 
domino tendencies of the federal 
government became apparent 
when it unilaterally created the 
excess crude account from which 
it draws revenue without 
appropriate legal frameworks and 
the approval of other federating 
units (States) in a system that 
should ordinarily be „independent 
and co-ordinate‟. As observed by 
Tinubu: 
 
the excess crude oil 
account is illegal and I 
therefore urge the 
governors of the 36 states 
of the federation to 
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challenge it at the courts 
because the constitution 
states that all revenues 
from the nation’s 
resources must be paid 
into the federation account 
(National Mirror 2013;2). 
 
The development has reinforced 
the super ordinate/subordinate 
relation in Nigeria‟s fiscal 
federalism and this has had 
unsalutory effect on effective 
intergovernmental relations 
especially at the vertical level. The 
evolution of the Nigeria 
Governor‟s forum, another 
instrument of conducting 
intergovernmental relations in the 
fourth republic, has only been to 
challenge the ubiquity and the 
overbearing powers of the federal 
government particularly on matters 
affecting both levels of 
government. The forum is strongly 
advocating a significant cut in 
federal government‟s powers of 
the purse in favour of states and 
local governments who arguably 
are more visible in state-citizen 
relation, suggesting therefore that 
federal revenue should be 
allocated in the ratio of 35% to the 
federal, 42% to states and 23% to 
local governments on the basis of 
geographical configuration, 
demographic spread, social 
development and regional revenue 
drive (www.transformation.com). 
 
The different contortions Nigeria 
has witnessed in revenue 
allocation debate, resource control 
agitations and jurisdictional 
allocation of responsibilities and 
power between the different levels 
of government have been 
responsible for a static fiscal 
federalism and the 
underdevelopment syndrome the 
naturally endowed but artificially 
incoherent country and 
managerially deficient country has 
experienced in the fourth republic. 
This has unprecedentedly 
increased the demand for political 
restructuring that can guarantee a 
true Nigerian federation. 
 
CONCLUSION: Towards an 
Improved and Developmental 
Fiscal Federalism 
Formulations on the theory and 
practice of fiscal federalism in 
Nigeria are numerous and growing 
(Akpan 1995, Akpan 2004, 
Akinsanya 1989, Olutayo 1998, 
Adefulu 2001, Adebayo 1998, 
Mbanefo and Egwaikhide 1998, 
Oketa 2001 etc). But one reducible 
conclusion as instructively 
observed by Adefulu (2001:78) is 
that the sharing of federally 
derived revenue, a seemingly 
contentious issue has generated 
fierce competition and partisan 
politics among the federal, state 
and local governments in Nigeria. 
However, to achieve a 
developmental fiscal federalism, it 
is expedient to take pragmatic 
initiatives and harmonize plausible 
options dynamic enough to resolve 
challenges that arise from federal-
state-local fiscal relations. One of 
such is the recognition that the 
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current federal structure of Nigeria 
is arguably defective thus it is 
more than expedient to restructure 
the whole polity to reflect „true 
federalism‟ that institutionally 
copes with the twin but difficult 
tasks of maintaining unity while 
also preserving diversity (Jinadu 
1971:13) and in which federating 
units are coordinate and 
independent (Wheare 1953:10). 
 
 The demand for political 
restructuring becomes more 
imperative as many insurgent 
groups and ethnic militias have 
unprecedentedly seized the fourth 
republic on accounts of inequity, 
injustice and lack of fairness in 
governance processes. The politics 
of restructuring is however the 
daunting challenge the country 
faces. This is because the process 
of restructuring through 
constitutional re-engineering has 
been highly politicized with 
various schools of thought 
polarized between whether the 
process should be anchored by the 
current legislature which is 
„popularly‟ elected by the 
electorates or „a sovereign 
assembly of nationalities‟ in the 
country to decide the yet to be 
resolved national questions which 
bother on how the various 
nationalities would continue to 
live together while deriving 
maximum benefits from the union, 
the system of government suitable 
and practicable for the country and 
the methods of sharing political 
power, all in a bid to decide who 
gets what, when and how. 
Intergovernmental fiscal relation, 
which in principle, is an economic 
matter has become more of a 
political issue essentially to 
achieve sectional and particularist 
interests. It is incontrovertible, as 
usefully noted by Dudley (1982:8) 
that the major political issue in 
Nigeria today is not the unity of 
the country, but of the distribution 
of wealth.  
 
True federalism will engender 
economic competition, efficient 
and effective resource 
mobilization and utilization which 
would have salutary implication 
for development. The argument 
put forward here is that states and 
even local governments should be 
constitutionally allowed to control 
resources gifted them by nature 
and located within their 
jurisdictions while the federal 
government should assume the 
position of a regulator, facilitator 
and enabler of economic activities 
with the power to collect 
royalties/taxes on these resources 
to execute federal projects. Sub-
national governments need to be 
better empowered in terms of 
responsibilities and powers of the 
purse since they are closer to the 
people at both urban and 
grassroots level. The implication 
of the above is that more powers 
and responsibilities are devolved 
to sub-national governments to 
allow for even and rapid 
development. By extension, 
politics at the centre would look 
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less attractive but more focused 
and issue-based.  
 
Second, states and local 
governments should as a matter of 
reality focus more on economic 
entrepreneurship rather than 
political entrepreneurship in order 
to boost their internally generated 
revenue and create more wealth 
within their domains so as to move 
out of their dependency syndrome. 
Oil has undoubtedly created more 
crises (economic, political, and 
ethnic/communal) in Nigeria than 
it tended to solve. The dynamic 
management of economic 
resources by the Lagos state 
government saved it from sudden 
and impending economic crises 
and possibly collapse when the 
Obasanjo administration 
deliberately „raped‟ the 
constitution with impunity by 
withholding federal allocations 
meant for the local governments in 
the state between 2004 and 2007 
on the ground that the former 
created additional local 
government councils without 
federal approval. But dynamism in 
economic entrepreneurship and 
fiscal operation can only be 
realized when the rule of law 
operates in its highest form free 
from political maneuvering. 
Constitutionalism is therefore a 
recipe that can ensure and 
guarantee a smooth, unhindered 
federal-state-local fiscal relation in 
Nigeria. 
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